We propose multi-bit versions of several single-bit cryptosystems based on lattice problems, the error-free version of the Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem by Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Halevi [CRYPTO '97], the Regev cryptosystems [JACM 2004 and STOC 2005], and the Ajtai cryptosystem [STOC 2005]. We develop a universal technique derived from a general structure behind them for constructing their multi-bit versions without increase in the size of ciphertexts. By evaluating the trade-off between the decryption errors and the hardness of underlying lattice problems, it is shown that our multi-bit versions encrypt O(log n)-bit plaintexts into ciphertexts of the same length as the original ones with reasonable sacrifices of the hardness of the underlying lattice problems. Our technique also reveals an algebraic property, named pseudohomomorphism, of the lattice-based cryptosystems.
Introduction
Lattice-Based Cryptosystems. The lattice-based cryptosystems have been well-studied since Ajtai's seminal result [2] on a one-way function based on the worst-case hardness of lattice problems, which initiated the cryptographic use of lattice problems. Ajtai and Dwork first succeeded to construct public-key cryptosystems [6] based on the unique shortest vector problem (uSVP). After their results, a number of latticebased cryptosystems have been proposed in the last decade by using cryptographic advantages of lattice problems [13, 10, 34, 4, 35] .
We can roughly classify the lattice-based cryptosystems into two types: (A) those who are efficient on the size of their keys and ciphertexts and the speed of encryption/decryption procedures, but have no security proofs based on the hardness of well-known lattice problems, and (B) those who have security proofs based on the lattice problems but are inefficient.
For example, the GGH cryptosystem [14] , NTRU [19] and their improvements [24, 31, 29, 18] belong to the type (A). These are efficient multi-bit cryptosystems related to lattices, but it is unknown whether their security is based on the hardness of well-known lattice problems. Actually, a few papers reported security issues of cryptosystems in this type [28, 11] .
On the other hand, those in the type (B) have security proofs based on well-known lattice problems such as uSVP, the shortest vector problem (SVP) and the shortest linearly independent vectors problem (SIVP) [6, 34, 35] . (See Appendix E for their definitions and computational complexity.) In particular, the security of these cryptosystems can be guaranteed by the worst-case hardness of the lattice problems, i.e., breaking the cryptosystems on average is at least as hard as solving the lattice problems in the worst case. This Ajtai-Dwork Regev'04 cryptosystem AD GGH [13] Table 1 : summary. (ε is any positive constant andÕ ( f (n)) means O ( f (n) poly(log n) ) .)
of the ciphertexts, but we can guarantee the same security level as that of the original cryptosystem and decrypt E(x 1 ) + E(x 2 ) to x 1 ⊕ x 2 by the original private key with a small decryption error. We refer to this property as the pseudohomomorphism. Goldwasser and Kharchenko actually made use of a similar property to construct the plaintext knowledge proof system for the Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem [15] . Unfortunately, it is only over Z 2 (and direct product groups of Z 2 by concatenating the ciphertexts) that we can operate the addition of the plaintexts in the single-bit cryptosystems. It is unlikely that we can naively simulate the addition over large cyclic groups by concatenating ciphertexts in such single-bit cryptosystems.
In this paper, we present the pseudohomomorphic property of mAD GGH , mR04, mR05, and (a slightly modified version mA05 ′ of) mA05 over larger cyclic groups. We believe that this property extends the possibility of the cryptographic applications of the lattice-based cryptosystems.
Main Idea for Multi-Bit Constructions and Their Security. We can actually find the following general structure behind the single-bit cryptosystems AD GGH , R04, R05, and A05: Their ciphertexts of 0 are basically distributed according to a periodic Gaussian distribution and those of 1 are also distributed according to another periodic Gaussian distribution whose peaks are shifted to the middle of the period. We thus embed two periodic Gaussian distributions into the ciphertext space such that their peaks appear alternatively and regularly. (See the left side of Figure 1.) Our technique is based on a generalization of this structure. More precisely, we regularly embed multiple periodic Gaussian distributions into the ciphertext space rather than only two ones. (See the right side of Figure 1 .) Embedding p periodic Gaussian distributions as shown in this figure, the ciphertexts for a plaintext i ∈ {0, . . . , p − 1} are distributed according the i-th periodic Gaussian distribution. This cyclic structure enables us not only to improve the efficiency of the cryptosystems but also to guarantee their security.
If we embed too many periodic Gaussian distributions, the decryption errors increase due to the overlaps of the distributions. We can then decrease the decryption errors by reducing their variance. However, it is known that smaller variance generally makes such cryptosystems less secure, as commented in [13] . We therefore have to evaluate the trade-offs in our multi-bit versions between the decryption errors and their security, which depend on their own structures of the cryptosystems.
Once we evaluate their trade-offs, we can apply a general strategy based on the cyclic structure to the security proofs. The security of the original cryptosystems basically depends on the indistinguishability between a certain periodic Gaussian distribution Φ and a uniform distribution U since it is shown in their security proofs that we can construct an efficient algorithm for a certain hard lattice problem by employing an efficient distinguisher between Φ and U. The goal is thus to construct the distinguisher from an adversary against the multi-bit version.
We first assume that there exists an efficient adversary for distinguishing between two Gaussian distributions corresponding two kinds of ciphertexts in our multi-bit version with its public key. By the hybrid argument, the adversary can distinguish either between Φ i and U or between Φ j and U. We now suppose that it can distinguish between Φ i and U. Note that we can slide Φ i to Φ 0 corresponding to ciphertexts of 0 even if we do not know the private key by the cyclic property of the ciphertexts. Thus, we obtain an efficient distinguisher between Φ 0 and U. Φ 0 is in fact a variance-reduced version of the periodic Gaussian distribution Φ used in the original cryptosystem. We can guarantee the indistinguishability between such a version Φ 0 and U is based on the hardness of another lattice problem slightly easier than the original one. We can therefore guarantee the security of our multi-bit versions similarly to the original ones.
Encryption and Decryption in Multi-Bit Versions. We also exploit this cyclic structure for the correctness of encryption and decryption procedures. In the original cryptosystems except for R05, the private key is the period d of the periodic Gaussian distribution, and the public key consists of the information for generating the periodic Gaussian distribution corresponding to 0 and the information for shifting the distribution to the other distribution corresponding to 1. The latter information for the shift essentially is k(d/2) for a random odd number k. Then, if we want to encrypt a plaintext 0, we generate the periodic Gaussian distribution corresponding to 0. Also, if we want to encrypt 1, we generate the distribution corresponding to 0 and then shift it using the latter information.
The private and public keys in our multi-bit versions are slightly different from those of the original ones. The major difference is the information for shifting the distribution. If the size of the plaintext space is p, the information for the shift is essentially k(d/p), where the number k must be a coprime to p for unique decryption. We then interpret the number k as a generator of the "group" of periodic Gaussian distributions. We adopt a prime as the size of the plaintext space p for efficient public key generation in our constructions. The private key also contains this number k other than the period d. Therefore, we can construct correct encryption and decryption procedures using this information k.
In the cases of R05 and mR05, it is not necessary for keys to contain the information for the shift. We can actually obtain such information due to their own structures even if it is not given from the public key. Thus, p is not necessarily a prime in mR05.
Pseudohomomorphism in Multi-Bit Versions. The regular embedding of the periodic Gaussian distributions also gives our multi-bit cryptosystems the algebraic property named pseudohomomorphism. Recall that a Gaussian distribution has the following reproducing property: For two random variables X 1 and X 2 according to N(m 1 , s 2 1 ) and N(m 2 , s 2 2 ), where N(m, s 2 ) is a Gaussian distribution with mean m and standard deviation s, the distribution of
. This property implies that the sum of two ciphertexts (i.e., the sum of two periodic Gaussian distributions) becomes a variant of a ciphertext (i.e., a periodic Gaussian distribution with larger variance). This sum can be moreover decrypted into the sum of two plaintexts with the private key of the multi-bit version, and has the indistinguishability based on the security of the multi-bit version. By precise analysis of our multi-bit versions, we estimate the upper bound of the number of the ciphertexts which can be summed without the change of the security and the decryption errors.
Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We describe basic notions and notations for lattice-based cryptosystems in Section 2. In Section 3, we first review the improved Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem AD GGH and then describe the corresponding multi-bit version mAD GGH in detail. We put the description of the other multi-bit versions mR04, mR05 and mA05 to the appendices since the main idea of their constructions are based on the same universal technique and the difference among them is mainly the evaluation of the trade-offs in each of cryptosystems. We also give concluding remarks in Section 4. 
Basic Notions and Notations
The vector x ∈ R n reduced modulo the parallelepiped P(B), denoted by x mod P(B), is the unique vector y ∈ P(B) such that y − x ∈ L(B). The dual lattice L * of a lattice L is the set L * = {x ∈ R n : ⟨x, y⟩ ∈ Z for all y ∈ L}. If L is generated by basis B, then (B T ) −1 is a basis for the dual lattice, where B T is the transpose of B. For more details on lattices, see the textbook by Micciancio and Goldwasser [26] .
The security parameter n of lattice-based cryptosystems is given by dimension of a lattice in the lattice problems on which security of the cryptosystems are based. Let ⌊x⌉ be the closest integer to x ∈ R (if there are two such integers, we choose the smaller.) and frc (x) = |x − ⌊x⌉| for x ∈ R, i.e., frc (x) is the distance from x to the closest integer. We define x mod y as x − ⌊x/y⌋ y for x, y ∈ R.
The length of a vector
The inner product of two vectors x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) T ∈ R n and y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) T ∈ R n , denoted by ⟨x, y⟩, is ∑ n i=1 x i y i . A function f (n) is called negligible for sufficiently large n if lim n→∞ n c f (n) = 0 for any constant c > 0. We similarly call f (n) a non-negligible function if there exists a constant c > 0 such that f (n) > n −c for sufficiently large n. We call probability p exponentially close to 1 if p = 1 − 2 −Ω(n) . We represent a real number by rounding its fractional part. If the fractional part of x ∈ R is represented in m bits, the rounded numberx has the precision of 1/2 m , i.e., we have |x −x| ≤ 1/2 m .
We say that an algorithm distinguishes between two distributions if the gap between the acceptance probability for their samples is non-negligible.
A Gaussian distribution N(m, s 2 ) with mean m and standard derivation s is a distribution on R defined by the density function ν(l) = 1/( √ 2πs) exp(−((l − m)/ √ 2s) 2 ). We will make use of many variants of the Gaussian distribution in this paper. We define them when required.
A Multi-Bit Version of the Improved Ajtai-Dwork Cryptosystem
On behalf of four cryptosystems AD GGH , R04, R05, and A05, we discuss the improved Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem AD GGH given by Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Halevi [13] in detail and apply our technique to construction of its multi-bit version mAD GGH in this section.
The Improved Ajtai-Dwork Cryptosystem and Its Multi-Bit Version
For understanding our construction intuitively, we first overview the protocol of AD GGH . Let N = n n = 2 n log n . We define an n-dimensional hypercube C and an n-dimensional ball B r as C = {x ∈ R n : 0 ≤ x i < N, i = 1, . . . , n} and B r = {x ∈ R n : ∥x∥ ≤ n −r /4} for any constant r ≥ 7, respectively. For u ∈ R n and an integer i we define a hyperplane H i as H i = {x ∈ R n : ⟨x, u⟩ = i}. Figures 2  and 3 .) Then, the private key is the normal vector u. These distributions of ciphertexts can be obtained from its public key, which consists of vectors on the hidden hyperplanes and information i 1 for shifting a vector on the hyperplanes to another vector on the intermediate hyperplanes. If we know the normal vector, we can reduce the n-dimensional distribution to on the 1-dimensional one along the normal vector. Then, we can easily find whether a ciphertext distributed around the hidden hyperplanes or the intermediate ones.
We now describe the protocol of AD GGH as follows. Our description slightly generalizes the original one by introducing a parameter r, which controls the variance of the distributions since we need to estimate a trade-off between the security and the size of plaintexts in our multi-bit version.
Preparation: All the participants agree with the security parameter n, the variance-controlling parameter r, and the precision 2 −n for rounding real numbers.
Key Generation: We choose u uniformly at random from the n-dimensional unit ball. Let m = n 3 . Repeating the following procedure m times, we sample m vectors v 1 , . . . , v m : (1) We choose a i from {x ∈ C : ⟨x, u⟩ ∈ Z} uniformly at random, (2) choose b 1 , . . . , b n from B r uniformly at random, (3) and output v i = a i + ∑ n j=1 b j as a sample. We then take the minimum index i 0 satisfying that the width of P(vi 0 +1 , . . . , v i 0 +n ) is at least n −2 N, where width of a parallelepiped P(x1, . . . x n ) is defined as min i=1,...,n Dist(x i , span(x 1 , . . . , x i−1 , x i+1 , . . . , x n )) for a distance function Dist(·, ·) between a vector and an (n − 1)-dimensional hyperplane. Now let w j = v i 0 + j for every j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, V = (v 1 , . . . , v m ), and W = (w 1 , . . . , w n ). We also choose an index i 1 uniformly at random from {i : ⟨a i , u⟩ is odd}, where a i is the vector appeared in the sampling procedure for v i . Note that there are such indices i 0 and i 1 with probability 1 − o (1) . If such indices do not exist, we perform this procedure again. To guarantee the security, ∥u∥ should be in [1/2, 1). The probability of this event is exponentially close to 1. If the condition is not satisfied, we sample the vector u again. Then, the private key is u and the public key is (V, W, i 1 ). Encryption: Let S be a uniformly random subset of {1, 2, . . . , m}. We encrypt a plaintext σ ∈ {0, 1} to
. Decryption: Let x ∈ P(W) be a received ciphertext. We decrypt x to 0 if frc (⟨x, u⟩) ≤ 1/4 and to 1 otherwise.
Carefully reading the results in [6, 13] , we obtain the following theorem on the cryptosystem AD GGH . As commented in [9] , we can actually improve the security of AD GGH by a result in [9] . We give the precise proof in Appendix D. We next describe the multi-bit version mAD GGH of AD GGH . Let p be a prime such that 2 ≤ p ≤ n r−7 , where the parameter r controls a trade-off between the size of the plaintext space and the hardness of underlying lattice problems. In mAD GGH , we can encrypt a plaintext of log p bits into a ciphertext of the same size as AD GGH . The strategy of our construction basically follows the argument in Section 1. Note that the parameter r is chosen to keep our version error-free.
Preparation: All the participants agree with the parameters n, r and the precision 2 −n similarly to AD GGH , and additionally the size p of the plaintext space. Key Generation: The key generation procedure is almost the same as that of AD GGH . We choose an index i ′ 1 uniformly at random from {i : ⟨a i , u⟩ 0 mod p} instead of i 1 in the original key generation procedure. We set decryption information k ≡ ⟨a i ′
1
, u⟩ mod p. Note that there is such a k with probability (1) . Then, the private key is (u, k) and the public key is (V, W, i ′ 1 ). Encryption: Let S be a uniformly random subset of {0, 1} m . We encrypt σ ∈ {0, . .
We decrypt a received ciphertext x ∈ P(W) to ⌊p ⟨x, u⟩⌉ k −1 mod p, where k −1 is the inverse of k in Z p .
Before evaluating the performance of mAD GGH precisely, we give the summary of the results as follows. 
(W) with its public key, then there exists a polynomial-time algorithm that solves O(n r+4 )-uSVP in the worst case with non-negligible probability.
In what follows, we demonstrate the performance of mAD GGH stated in the above theorems.
Decryption Errors of mAD GGH
We first evaluate the decryption error probability in mAD GGH . The following theorem can be proven by a similar argument to the analysis of [6, 13] . Since we generalize this theorem for analysis of the pseudohomomorphism in mAD GGH (Theorem 3.10), we here give a precise proof.
Theorem 3.5. The cryptosystem mAD GGH makes no decryption errors.
Proof. Since the decryption error probability for any ciphertext can be estimated by sliding the distribution to that of the ciphertext of 0, we first estimate the decryption error probability for the ciphertext of 0.
Let
Thus, we can obtain frc (⟨v i , u⟩) ≤ n 1−r /4 and frc (⟨∑ i∈S v i , u ⟩) ≤ n 4−r /4. Next, we estimate an inner product between ∑ i∈S v i mod P(W) and u. Let ∑ i∈S v i = r + ∑ n j=1 q j w j , where r ∈ P(W). Since ∥w j ∥ ≥ n −2 N and p ≤ n r−7 , we have |q j | ≤ n 5 and
Therefore, we decrypt a ciphertext of 0 into 0 without decryption errors. Now let ρ be a ciphertext of σ. Let Z ± a := {x ∈ R : frc (x) ≤ a} for a ≥ 0 and Z + a ± b := {x ∈ R : frc (x − a) ≤ b} for a, b ≥ 0. By a property of the key generation, we have
Therefore, we obtain ⟨ρ, u⟩ ∈ Z + kσ/p ± 1/(2p) and decrypt ρ into σ without decryption errors.
Security of mAD GGH
We next prove the security of mAD GGH . Let U P(W) be a uniform distribution on P(W). We denote the encryption function of AD GGH by E defined as a random variable E(σ, (V, W, i 1 )) for a plaintext σ and a public key (V, W, i 1 ). If the public key is obvious, we abbreviate E(σ, (V, W, i 1 )) to E(σ). Similarly, the encryption function E m is defined for mAD GGH .
First, we show that the indistinguishability between two certain distributions is based on the worst-case hardness of uSVP. The following lemma can be obtained by combining Theorem 3.2 and the results in [6] and [13] with our generalization. We next present the indistinguishability between the ciphertexts of 0 in mAD GGH and U P(W) .
Lemma 3.7. If there exists a polynomial-time algorithm
Proof. We denote by ε(n) the non-negligible gap of the acceptance probability of D 1 between E m (0) and U P(W) with its public key. We will construct the distinguisher D 2 from the given algorithm D 1 . To run D 1 correctly, we first find the index i ′ 1 by estimating the gap of acceptance probability between E m (0) and U P(W) with the public key. If we can find i ′ 1 , we output the result of D 1 using i ′ 1 with the public key. Otherwise, we output a uniformly random bit. For random inputs of ciphertexts and public keys, the above procedure can distinguish between them.
We now describe the details of D 2 as follows. We denote by x and (V, W, i 1 ) a ciphertext and a public key of AD GGH given as an input for D 2 , respectively. Also,
, where the probability p 0 is taken over the inner random bits of the encryption procedure and p U is taken over U P(W) . 
, we take j ′ as the component of the public key.
(D3) We output D 1 (x, (V, W, j ′ )) if we find j ′ . Otherwise, we output a uniformly random bit.
Note that we have |p 0 − x 0 ( j ′ )/T | ≤ ε/4 and |p U − x U ( j ′ )/T | ≤ ε/4 with probability exponentially close to 1 by the Hoeffding bound [17] . Therefore, we succeed to choose the index j ′ with which D 1 can distinguish between the target distributions with probability exponentially close to 1 if j ′ exists. By the above argument, D 1 works correctly for a non-negligible fraction of all the inputs.
The next lemma can be proven by the hybrid argument.
). Proof. By the hybrid argument, the distinguisher D 3 can distinguish between E m (σ 1 ) and U P(W) or between E m (σ 2 ) and U P(W) with its public key. Without loss of generality, we can assume that D 3 can distinguish between E m (σ 1 ) and U P(W) with its public key. Note that we have
). We can therefore obtain the polynomial-time algorithm
By the above three lemmas, we obtain the security proof for our multi-bit version mAD GGH . 
Pseudohomomorphism of mAD GGH
As stated in Theorem 3.4, mAD GGH has the pseudohomomorphic property. To demonstrate this property, we have to evaluate the decryption errors for sum of ciphertexts and prove its security.
Decryption Errors for Sum of Ciphertexts. First, we evaluate the decryption errors when we apply the decryption procedure to the sum of ciphertexts in mAD GGH . Recall that Z ± a := {x ∈ R : frc (x) ≤ a} for a ≥ 0 and 
Proof. We define ρ 1 , . . . , ρ κ as ciphertexts of σ 1 , . . . , σ κ , respectively. We will show that we can decrypt
From the proof of Theorem 3.5, we have
Hence, we obtain
Combining with the fact ρ i ∈ P(W) and κp ≤ n r−7 , we have
Security for Sum of Ciphertexts. We can also give the security proof for the sum of ciphertexts in mAD GGH . The security proof obeys so general framework that we can apply the same argument to the security of sum of ciphertexts in the other multi-bit versions mR04, mR05, and mA05 ′ . For convenience of the other multi-bit versions, we here present an abstract security proof for sum of ciphertexts. We denote the encryption function of our multi-bit cryptosystems by E m , also regarded as a random variable E m (σ, pk) for a plaintext σ and a public key pk. If the public key is obvious, we abbreviate E m (σ, pk) to E m (σ). Let C be the ciphertext space and U C be the uniform distribution on C.
We first show that it is hard to distinguish between the sum of ciphertexts and the uniform distribution if it is hard to distinguish between κ samples from E m (0) and those from U C .
Lemma 3.11. If there exist two sequences of plaintexts
, then there exists a polynomial-time algorithm D 2 that distinguishes between κ ciphertexts and its public key (E m (0, pk), . . . , E m (0, pk), pk) and uniformly random κ ciphertexts and the public key (U C , . . . , U C , pk).
Proof. By the hybrid argument, the distinguisher
) and U C with its public key. Without loss of generality, we can assume that
, pk). This shows the polynomial-time distinguisher D 2 .
As already stated in Section 1 (and Lemma 3.7 in the case of AD GGH ), the original security proofs of AD GGH , R04, R05 and A05 show that we have efficient algorithms for certain lattice problems if there is an efficient distinguisher between E m (0) and U C with its public key. By the similar argument to that in original proofs, we also have such algorithms from efficient distinguisher D 2 between (E m (0), . . . , E m (0), pk) and (U C , . . . , U C , pk). Thus, we obtain from D 2 in Lemma 3.11 a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A that solve the worst case of O(n r+4 )-uSVP in the case of mAD GGH .
By combining the above discussion with Lemma 3.11, we guarantee the security of the sum of ciphertexts in mAD GGH . 
Theorem 3.12. If there exist two sequences of plaintext
(σ 1 , . . . , σ κ ) and (σ ′ 1 , . . . , σ ′ κ ) and a polynomial- time algorithm D 1 that distinguishes between ( ∑ κ i=1 E m (σ i ), pk) and ( ∑ κ i=1 E m (σ ′ i ), pk),
Concluding Remarks
We have developed a universal technique for constructing multi-bit versions of lattice-based cryptosystems using periodic Gaussian distributions and revealed their pseudohomomorphism. In particular, we have showed the details of the multi-bit version of the improved Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem in Section 3.
Although our technique achieved only logarithmic improvements on the length of plaintexts, we also obtained precise evaluation of the trade-offs between decryption errors and the hardness of underlying lattice problems in the single-bit cryptosystems. We believe that our evaluation is useful for further improvements of such single-bit cryptosystems.
Another direction of research on lattice-based cryptosystems is to find interesting cryptographic applications by their algebraic properties such as the pseudohomomorphism. Number-theoretic cryptosystems can provide a number of applications due to their algebraic structures, whereas lattice-based ones have few applications currently. For demonstration of the cryptographic advantages of lattice problems, it is important to develop the algebraic properties and their applications such as [15] .
[ In what follows, we precisely describe the original R04. We begin with the definition of a folded Gaussian distribution Ψ α whose density function is
. This distribution is obtained by "folding" a Gaussian distribution N(0, α 2 /(2π)) on R into the interval [−1/2, 1/2). Note that this folded Gaussian distribution is equivalent with the fractional part of N(0, α 2 /(2π)). Based on this distribution, R04 makes use of a periodic distribution Φ h,α defined by the following density function: Φ h,α (l) = Ψ α (lh mod 1). We can sample values according to this distribution by using samples from Φ α , as shown in [34]: (1) We sample x ∈ {0, . . . , ⌈h⌉} uniformly at random and then (2) sample y according to Ψ α . (3) If 0 ≤ (x + y)/h < 1, we then take the value as a sample. Otherwise, we repeat (1) and (2) .
Let N = 2 8n 2 , m = c 0 n 2 for a sufficiently large constant c 0 , and γ(n) = ω(n √ log n), specifying the size of the ciphertext space, the size of the public keys, and the variance of the folded Gaussian distribution, respectively. In this section, we require precision of 1/2 8n 2 = 1/N for rounding real numbers.
Preparation: All the participants agree with the security parameter n and the precision 2 −8n 2 .
We choose h ∈ H uniformly at random and set d = N/h. The private key is the number d. Choosing α ∈ [2/γ(n), (2 √ 2)/γ(n)), we sample m values z 1 , . . . , z m from the distribution Φ h,α , where z i = (x i + y i )/h (i = 1, . . . , m) according to the above sampling procedure. Let a i = ⌈Nz i ⌉ for every i ∈ {1, . . . , m}. Note that we have an index i 0 such that x i 0 is odd with a probability exponentially close to 1. Then, the public key is (a 1 , . . . , a m , i 0 ). We next propose a multi-bit version mR04 of the cryptosystem R04. Let p be a prime such that 2 ≤ p ≤ n r and δ(n) = ω(n 1+r √ log n) for any constant r > 0, where the parameter r controls the trade-off between the decryption errors (or the size of plaintext space) and the hardness of underlying lattice problems. Our cryptosystem mR04 can encrypt one of p plaintexts in {0, . . . , p − 1} into a ciphertext of the same size as one of R04.
As mentioned above, R04 relates the ciphertexts to two periodic Gaussian distributions Φ 0 and Φ 1 such that each of them has one peak in a period of length d. Our construction follows the argument in Section 1. The idea of our cryptosystem is embedding of p periodic Gaussian distributions Φ 0 , . . . , Φ p−1 corresponding to the plaintexts {0, . . . , p−1} into the same period of length d. We also adjust the parameter α, which affects the variance of the Gaussian distributions, to bound the decryption errors. Note that frc (h) also affects the decryption errors. Therefore, adjusting the set H simultaneously with α, we have to reduce the decryption errors by frc (h). Based on the above idea, we describe our cryptosystem mR04 as follows.
Preparation: All the participants agree with the parameters n and r, the precision 2 −8n 2 , and the size p of the plaintext space.
We choose h ∈ H r uniformly at random and set d = N/h. Choosing α ∈ [2/δ(n), (2 √ 2)/δ(n)), we sample m values z 1 , . . . , z m from the distribution Φ h,α , where z i = (x i + y i )/h (i = 1, . . . , m) according to the above sampling procedure. Let a i = ⌈Nz i ⌉ for every i ∈ {1, . . . , m}. Additionally, we choose an index i ′ 0 uniformly at random from {i : x i 0 mod p}. Then, we compute k ≡ x i ′ 0 mod p. The private key is (d, k) and the public key is (a 1 , . . . , a m , i ′ 0 ). Encryption: Let σ ∈ {0, . . . , p − 1} be a plaintext. We choose a uniformly random subset S of {1, . . . , m}.
The ciphertext is ( ∑ i∈S a i +
For a received ciphertext w ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}, we compute τ = w/d mod 1. We decrypt the ciphertext w to ⌊pτ⌉ k −1 mod p, where k −1 is the inverse of k in Z p .
Before evaluating the performance of mR04 precisely, we give the summary of the results as follows.
Theorem A.2. For any constant r > 0, let δ(n) = ω(n 1+r √ log n) and let p(n) be a prime such that 2 ≤ p(n) ≤ n r . The cryptosystem mR04 encrypts a ⌊log p(n)⌋-bit plaintext into an 8n 2 -bit ciphertext with decryption error probability at most 2 −Ω(δ 2 (n)/(n 2r m)) + 2 −Ω(n) . The security of mR04 is based on the worst case of O(δ(n) √ n)-uSVP. The size of a public key is the same as that of the original one. The size of a private key is ⌈log p(n)⌉ plus that of the original one.
For example, setting δ(n) = n 1+r log n for any constant r > 0, we obtain an ⌊r log n⌋-bit cryptosystem with negligible decryption error, whose security is based on the worst-case of O(n 1.5+r log n)-uSVP.
Theorem A.3 (pseudohomomorphism)
. Let δ(n) = ω(n 1+r √ log n). Also let p(n) be a prime and κ an integer such that κp ≤ n r for any constant r > 0. Let E m be the encryption function of mR04. For any κ plaintexts σ 1 , . . . , σ κ (0 ≤ σ i ≤ p − 1), we can decrypt the sum of κ ciphertexts 
with its public key, then there exists a polynomial-time algorithm that solves O(δ(n)
√ n)-uSVP in the worst case with non-negligible probability.
In what follows, we demonstrate the performance of mR04 stated in the above theorems.
A.2 Decryption Errors of mR04
We first give the analysis of the decryption errors.
Theorem A.4. The probability of the decryption errors in mR04 is at most 2 −Ω(δ 2 (n)/(n 2r m)) + 2 −Ω(n) .
We omit the proof of the decryption errors since it can be done by a quite similar analysis to [34] and we will prove the generalized theorem (Theorem A.9) in Appendix A.4.
A.3 Security of mR04
In what follows, we evaluate the security of our cryptosystem mR04. We first mention the result in [34] that the indistinguishability of two certain distributions is guaranteed by the hardness of a certain uSVP. Let U N and U 1 be the uniform distributions over {0, . . . , N − 1} and [0, 1), respectively.
Lemma A.5 ([34]). If there exists a polynomial-time distinguisher between Φ h,α and U 1 over uniformly random choices of h
∈ [ √ N, 2 √ N) and α ∈ [2/δ(n), 2 √ 2/δ(n)),
there exists a polynomial-time algorithm for the worst case of O(δ(n)
Thus, our task is to prove the security of our cryptosystem mR04 from this indistinguishability. For convenience of the proof, we introduce a parameterized version R04 ′ of the cryptosystem R04. In the key generation procedure of R04 ′ , we sample h from H r = {h ∈ [ √ N, 2 √ N) : frc (h) < 1/(8n r m)} and α from [2/δ, 2 √ 2/δ) uniformly at random. The other procedures in R04 ′ are the same as R04. Similarly to the case of R04, we can show that the indistinguishability between the ciphertexts of 0 in R04 ′ and U N can be guaranteed by the indistinguishability between Φ h,α and U N . Lemma A.6. For any constant r > 0, let p be a prime such that 2 ≤ p ≤ n r and δ(n) = ω(n 1+r √ log n).
If there exists a polynomial-time algorithm that distinguishes between ciphertexts of 0 in R04 ′ and U N with its public key, there exists a polynomial-time algorithm between Φ h,α and U 1 over uniformly random choices of
This lemma can be proven by the same way as [34] using the fact that 8n r m ∈ poly(n). By the same technique as the security proof of mAD GGH , we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma A.7. If there exist plaintexts σ 1 , σ 2 ∈ {0, . . . , p − 1} and a polynomial-time algorithm that distinguishes between the ciphertexts of σ 1 and σ 2 in mR04 with its public key, there exists a polynomial-time algorithm that distinguishes between the ciphertexts of 0 in R04 ′ and U N with its public key.
By the above lemmas, we can show the security of mR04 based on the hardness of uSVP. 
A.4 Pseudohomomorphism of mR04
Decryption Errors for Sum of Ciphertexts.
Theorem A.9 (mR04). Let δ(n) = ω(n 1+r √ log n). Also let p(n) be a prime and κ be an integer such that κp ≤ n r for any constant r > 0. For any κ plaintexts σ 1 , . . . , σ κ (0 ≤ σ i ≤ p − 1), we can decrypt the sum of κ ciphertexts
Before the proof, we need the following lemma given in [34] to bound the tails of Gaussian distributions.
Lemma A.10 ([34]). The probability that the distance of a normal variable with variance σ 2 from its mean is more than t is at most
, i.e.,
) .
By Lemma A.10, one can see easily that if σ ≤ 1/ √ n, the probability Pr
Proof. The proof is similar to the estimation of the decryption errors in [34] . First, we show the case that we have κ ciphertexts of 0, ρ 1 , . . . , ρ κ . The probabilities are taken over the choices of the private and public keys and the inner random bits of the encryption procedure. Let S 1 , . . . , S κ denote the subsets of indices used in the encryption procedure, i.e.,
Similarly to the argument for evaluation of the decryption errors in [34], we obtain
Hence, we have
where we used the fact that d = 2 Θ(4n 2 ) is much larger than m = c 0 n 2 . All x i are strictly less than ⌈h⌉ − 1 with probability exponentially close to 1. Conditioned on that, y 1 , . . . , y m are distributed according to Ψ α . Therefore, we have
by Lemma A.10. We thus obtain frc (ρ/d) < 1/(4p), which implies that we can decrypt ρ to 0 with decryption error probability at most 2 −Ω((δ(n)) 2 /mn 2r ) . Next, we consider κ ciphertexts ρ ′ 1 , . . . , ρ ′ κ of plaintexts σ 1 , . . . , σ κ respectively and set
By using the fact that k ≡ x i ′ 0 mod p and that with probability exponentially close to 1,
Since frc (ρ/d) < 1/(4p), we obtain
with the probability at most 2 −Ω((δ(n)) 2 /mn 2r ) , which completes the proof.
Security for Sum of Ciphertexts.
By similar argument in Section 3.4, we obtain the following theorem. 
then there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A that solves the worst case of O(δ(n)
√ n)-uSVP in the case of mR04.
B A Multi-Bit Version of the Regev'05 Cryptosystem

B.1 The Regev'05 Cryptosystem and Its Multi-Bit Version
The cryptosystem R05 proposed in 2005 [35] is also constructed by using a variant of Gaussian distributions. A folded Gaussian distribution Ψ α over [−1/2, 1/2) is given by a density function Ψ α (l) =
. Let m = 5(n + 1)(2 log n + 1) = Θ(n log n) and q(n) ∈ [n 2 , 2n 2 ] be a prime. The parameter α = α(n) satisfying conditions that α(n) = o(1/( √ n log n)) and α(n)q(n) > 2 √ n is used to control the variance of the distribution Ψ α . (In [35] , α is set to 1/( √ n log 2 n).) We also describe the discretized distribution on Z q from Ψ α . The Gaussian distribution Φ α on Z q is obtained by sampling from Ψ α , multiplying q, and rounding the closest integer modulo q. The distribution can be formally defined as Preparation: All the participants agree with the security parameter n, the variance-controlling parameter α, and the precision 2 −n . They also share m vectors a 1 , . . . , a m chosen from Z n q uniformly at random. Key Generation: The private key s is chosen uniformly at random from Z n q . We also choose e 1 , . . . , e m according to the distribution Φ α . Let b i = ⟨a i , s⟩ + e i for every i ∈ {1, . . . , m}. The public key is
We choose a uniformly random subset S of {1, . . . , m}. The ciphertext is (∑ i∈S a i ,
, and into 1 otherwise, where | · | is the absolute value function on Z q , i.e., |x| = min{x, q − x} for any x ∈ Z q .
Note that the security reduction of R05 is done by a polynomial-time quantum algorithm. In other word, if R05 is insecure, there exists a polynomial-time quantum algorithm for certain lattice problems. As shown in [35] , the cryptosystem R05 has the following performance.
Theorem B.1 ([35]).
The cryptosystem R05 encrypts a 1-bit plaintext into an (n + 1)⌈log q⌉-bit ciphertext with decryption error probability at most 2 −Ω(1/(mα 2 (n))) + 2 −Ω(n) . The security of R05 is based on the worst case of SVPÕ (n/α(n)) and SIVPÕ (n/α(n)) for polynomial-time quantum algorithms. The size of the public key is O(n log 2 n) and the size of the private key is O(n log n).
We now give our cryptosystem mR05 based on R05. (See Figure 7. ) Let r ∈ (0, 1) be any constant, which controls the trade-off between the size of plaintext space and the hardness of underlying lattice problems, and p be an integer such that p ≤ n r = o(n), which is the size of the plaintext space in mR05. mR05 can encrypt a plaintext in {0, . . . , p − 1} into a ciphertext of the same size as R05. We use the same parameters m and q as R05 and introduce a parameter β = β(n) = α(n)/n r = o (1/(n 0.5+r log n) ) to control the distribution instead of α in R05. The parameter β(n) must satisfy β(n)q(n) > 2 √ n.
Preparation: All the participants agree with the parameters n, β, the precision 2 −n , and the size p of the plaintext space. They also share m vectors a 1 , . . . , a m chosen from Z n q uniformly at random. Key Generation: This procedure is the same as R05 except that we sample e 1 , . . . , e m from Φ β . Encryption: We choose a uniformly random subset S of {1, . . . , m}. For a plaintext σ ∈ {0, . . . , p − 1}, the ciphertext is
Before evaluating the performance of mR05 precisely, we give the summary of the results as follows.
Theorem B.2. Let p = p(n) be an integer such that p(n)
≤ n r for any constant 0 < r < 1. The cryptosystem mR05 encrypts a ⌊ log p(n) ⌋ -bit plaintext into an (n+1)⌈log q⌉-bit ciphertext with decryption error probability at most 2 −Ω(1/(mβ 2 (n)n 2r )) + 2 −Ω(n) . The security of mR05 is based on the worst case of SVPÕ (n/β(n)) and SIVPÕ (n/β(n)) for polynomial-time quantum algorithms. The size of the public key and private key is the same as that of the original one.
For example, by setting p(n) = n r for a constant 0 < r < 1 and β(n) = 1/(n 0.5+r log 2 n), we obtain a ⌊ r log n ⌋ -bit cryptosystem with negligible decryption error whose security is based on SVPÕ (n 1.5+r ) and SIVPÕ (n 1.5+r ) .
Theorem B.3 (pseudohomomorphism).
Let p(n) be an integer and κ be an integer such that κp ≤ n r for any constant 0 < r < 1. Let E m be the encryption function of mR05. For any κ plaintexts σ 1 , . . . , σ κ (0 ≤ σ i ≤ p − 1), we can decrypt the sum of κ ciphertexts
σ i mod p with decryption error probability at most 2 −Ω(1/(mβ 2 (n)n 2r )) , where the addition is defined over Z n q × Z q . Moreover, if there exist two sequences of plaintexts (σ 1 , . . . , σ κ ) and (σ ′ 1 , . . . , σ ′ κ ), and a polynomial-time algorithm that distinguishes between
) with its public key, then there exist polynomial-time quantum algorithms that solve SVPÕ (n/β(n)) and SIVPÕ (n/β(n)) in the worst case with non-negligible probability.
In what follows, we demonstrate the performance of mR05 stated in the above theorems.
B.2 Decryption Errors of mR05
We first estimate the decryption errors in our cryptosystem mR05. By replacing the parameter α in R05 to the parameter β in mR05, we immediately obtain the evaluation of the decryption errors from Theorem B.1. The generalization of this theorem (Theorem B.8) is also given in Appendix B.4.
Theorem B.4. The probability of the decryption errors in mR05 is at most
2 −Ω(1/(mβ 2 (n)n 2r )) + 2 −Ω(n) .
B.3 Security of mR05
We next discuss the security of our cryptosystem mR05. Let U R05 be the uniform distribution over the ciphertext space Z n q × Z q of R05 (and mR05). The strategy of the security proof for mR05 is similar to mR04. We first mention the result in [35] that the indistinguishability between the ciphertexts of 0 in R05 and U R05 is guaranteed by the worst-case hardness of certain lattice problems.
Lemma B.5 ([35]). If there exists a polynomial-time algorithm that distinguishes between the ciphertexts of
0 in R05 and U R05 with its public key, there exists a polynomial-time quantum algorithm for the worst case of SVPÕ (n/α(n)) and SIVPÕ (n/α(n)) .
We now consider a slightly modified version R05
′ with the distribution parameter β(n) = α(n)/n r = o (1/(n 0.5+r log n) ) instead of α(n) in R05. Since the trade-off between the decryption error and the security of R05
′ is obtained by Theorem B.1, we can show the following lemma by the same technique as the security proof of mAD GGH .
Lemma B.6. If there exist plaintexts σ 1 , σ 2 ∈ {0, . . . , p − 1} and a polynomial-time algorithm that distinguishes between the ciphertexts of σ 1 and σ 2 in mR05 with its public key, there exists a polynomial-time algorithm that distinguishes between the ciphertexts of 0 in R05 ′ and U R05 with its public key.
By these lemmas, we can obtain the security of our cryptosystem mR05.
Theorem B.7. If there exist plaintexts σ 1 , σ 2 ∈ {0, . . . , p − 1}, and a polynomial-time algorithm that distinguishes between the ciphertext of σ 1 and σ 2 in mR05 with its public key, there exists a polynomial-time quantum algorithm for the worst-case of SVPÕ (n/β(n)) and SIVPÕ (n/β(n)) .
We omit the proof of the security since it is quite similar to mAD GGH .
B.4 Pseudohomomorphism of mR05
Theorem B.8 (mR05). Let β(n) = o(1/(n 0.5+r log n)). Also let p(n) be an integer and κ be an integer such that κp ≤ n r for any constant
σ i mod p with decryption error probability at most 2 −Ω(1/(mβ 2 (n)n 2r )) , where the addition is defined over Z n q × Z q .
Proof. The proof is similar to [35] . First, we estimate the decryption errors for the sum of κ ciphertexts of 0, (ρ 1 , υ 1 ), . . . , (ρ κ , υ κ ). The probabilities are taken over the choices of the private and public keys and the randomness of the encryption procedure. Let S 1 , . . . , S κ denote the subsets of indices used in the encryption procedure, i.e., (
j∈S i e j = υ − ⟨ρ, s⟩ in the key generation. We will show
where e 1 , . . . , e κ are samples from the distribution Φ β and |x| := min{x, q−x} for x ∈ [0, q−1). A sample from Φ β can be obtained by sampling x i from Ψ β and outputting ⌊qx i ⌉ mod q. Notice that
∑ j∈S i qx i mod q for sufficiently large n. Therefore, it is sufficient to show
where x 1 , . . . , x κ are independently distributed according to Ψ β . That is, it is sufficient to show
Similarly to the argument in Theorem A.9, we obtain
It follows that we can decrypt (ρ, υ) into 0 with decryption error probability at most 2 −Ω(1/(mβ 2 n 2r )) . Next, we consider κ ciphertexts (ρ
Combining the equation (1) and the fact that
σ i mod p with decryption error probability at most 2 −Ω(1/(mβ 2 n 2r )) .
Security for Sum of Ciphertexts. By similar argument in Section 3.4, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem B.9. If there exist two sequences of plaintext
, thenthere exists a polynomial-time quantum algorithm for the worst case of SVPÕ (n/α(n)) and SIVPÕ (n/α(n)) in the case of mR05.
C A Multi-Bit Version of the Ajtai Cryptosystem
C.1 The Ajtai Cryptosystem and Its Multi-Bit Version
Let b be a uniformly random string of O(n 2 log n) bits and t be a random string of O(n log n) bits specified later. We denote by ν (n) s a Gaussian distribution on an n-dimensional Euclidean space with mean 0 and standard deviation s. The density function is given by ν (n) s (x) = s −n exp(−π ∥x/s∥ 2 ). Note that, given an orthonormal basis for R n , ν (n) s can be written as the sum of n orthogonal 1-dimensional Gaussian distributions along one of the basis vectors. For instance, given a basis {e 1 , . . . , e n }, ν (n)
x i e i . Ajtai showed how to generate a certain class of efficiently representable lattices related to hard problems in [4] . He also succeeded to construct two lattice-based cryptosystems based on the original Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem [6] and the improved Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem [13] . The latter one reduces decryption error from the former one by the idea of [13] . In this section, we only describe the former one, which is related to security of our cryptosystem.
In the Ajtai cryptosystem A05, we make use of a periodic Gaussian distribution on R n such that its peaks are located on the points of the dual lattice spanned by a basis F of an instance L(b, t) of uSVP obtained in the preparation procedure. Then, the periodic Gaussian distribution looks like a "wave" going along the shortest vector u of L(b, t) since the dual lattice of L(b, t), which is an instance of uSVP, has a much longer interval between two (n − 1)-dimensional sublattices orthogonal to u than others. (See Figure 8. ) Then, the ciphertexts of 0 correspond to the periodic Gaussian distribution modulo P(F) and those of 1 correspond to the uniform distribution on P(F) in the cryptosystem A05. Similarly to the previous cryptosystems, if we Figure 8 : ciphertexts of 0 in A05 know u, we can easily decrypt a received ciphertext by the inner product between the ciphertext and u with high probability.
We now describe the details of the Ajtai cryptosystem A05. All the participants share a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm D, a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm B, and a uniformly random string b. In the preparation procedure, D generates a random string t and a vector u in a lattice L(b, t) from b. Also, B generates a basis B(b, t) of the lattice L(b, t) if strings b and t are given. Then, the probability that L(b, t) is an instance of n 1/2+r -uSVP and u is its unique shortest vector such that n −r/2 ≤ ∥u∥ ≤ n −r/3 is exponentially close to 1. Now let F = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) be a basis of the dual lattice of L(b, t). We also denote by U P(F) the uniform distribution on P(F).
Preparation: All the participants agree with the security parameter n, and share the algorithms B, D and the random string b. Key Generation: We give b to the procedure D, and then obtain t and u. Then, the private key is u and the public key is t. Encryption: Let σ ∈ {0, 1} be an encrypted plaintext. If σ = 0, we choose z from a Gaussian distribution on the n-dimensional Euclidean space given by the density function ν (n) (x) = exp(−π ∥x∥ 2 ). We then set y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) T = z mod P(F). If σ = 1, we choose y from the uniform distribution U P(F) . These operations for real numbers are done with precision 2 −n log n . The ciphertextȳ = (ȳ 1 , . . . ,ȳ n ) T is obtained by rounding y with precision of 1/n, i.e., we have |ȳ i − y i | ≤ 1/n for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Decryption: We decrypt a received ciphertextȳ to 0 if frc (⟨ȳ, u⟩) ≤c √ log n ∥u∥ and to 1 otherwise, wherẽ c is a constant given in [4] . This operation is also done with precision 2 −n log n .
Summarizing the results on A05, he mentioned the following theorem in [4] . Since the ciphertexts of A05 are rounded with precision of 1/n and use a compact representation of lattices, the ciphertexts and the keys can be represented by O(n log n) bits. For the definition of the underlying problem DA ′ , see Appendix E.
Theorem C.1 ([4]).
The cryptosystem A05 encrypts a 1-bit plaintext into an O(n log n)-bit ciphertext with decryption error probability at mostÕ(n −r/3 ). The security of A05 is based on the average case of DA ′ . The size of the public key and the private key is O(n log n).
We show the multi-bit cryptosystem mA05 as follows. Let λ be the length of the unique non-zero shortest vector u, i.e., λ = ∥u∥. We generalized the standard deviation of n-dimensional Gaussian distribution in en-cryption procedure for the sake of a discuss of a pseudohomomorphism. We use ν (n)
2 ) instead of ν (n) in the original cryptosystem. If we set s = 1, the security of our cryptosystem is based on the security of the original one. We suppose that η(n) = ω( √ log n) is a parameter to control a trade-off between decryption errors and size of plaintexts and 1/n is the precision of rounding in the encryption procedure as same as in the original. To guarantee the decryption errors, we suppose that s > √ λ/η(n). Let a prime p be the size of plaintext space such that p < n r/6 /(4sη(n)). Note that p ≤ 1/(4 √ λsη(n)).
Preparation: All the participants agree with the parameters n and s, and the size p of the plaintext space. They also share the algorithms B, D and the random string b. Key Generation: This procedure is the same as that of A05 except that we add an index i 1 chosen uniformly at random from {i : ⟨f i , u⟩ 0 mod p} to the public key and k ≡ ⟨ f i 1 , u ⟩ mod p to the private key. Thus, the private key is (u, k) and the public key is (t, i 1 ). Encryption: Let σ ∈ {0, . . . , p − 1} be a plaintext. We choose z from the Gaussian distribution ν (n) s . Then, the ciphertextȳ is obtained by rounding y = σ p f i 1 + z mod P(F) with the precision of 1/n, i.e., we have |ȳ i − y i | ≤ 1/n for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Decryption: We decrypt a received ciphertextȳ into ⌈p ⟨ȳ, u⟩⌋k −1 mod p, where k −1 is the inverse of k in Z p .
Before evaluating the performance of mA05 precisely, we give the summary of the results as follows.
Theorem C.2. The cryptosystem mA05 encrypts a ⌊ log p(n) ⌋ -bit plaintext into an O(n log n)-bit ciphertext with decryption error probability at most 2 −Ω(η 2 (n)) , where p < n r/6 /(4sη(n)) and s > √ λ/η(n). Setting η(n) = log n, we obtain an O(log n)-bit cryptosystem with negligible decryption errors. Finally, we discuss the pseudohomomorphic property of mA05. We consider a modified version mA05
Proof. Letȳ be a ciphertext of a plaintext σ. It is enough to show
By the rounding precision of 1/n, we also have | ⟨(ȳ − y), u⟩ | ≤ λ. Therefore, we have
(In the last inequality, we use the fact that
Notice that the fractional part of ⟨z, u⟩ then has a folded Gaussian distribution Ψ √ λs . (Recall that its density function Ψ σ is of the form
.) By Lemma A.10, we have
This completes the proof.
C.3 Security of mA05
The security of our cryptosystem mA05 can be also proven by a similar technique to mAD GGH . 
C.4 Pseudohomomorphism of mA05
′ Decryption Errors for Sum of Ciphertexts.
C.4.1 Evaluation for mA05
′ Recall that we adopt the precision of 2 −n log n for the ciphertexts in mA05 ′ . We denote by E s m the encryption function of mA05 ′ such that we use the Gaussian distribution with standard deviation s in the encryption procedure.
Theorem C.6 (mA05 ′ ). Let η(n) = ω( √ log n). Also let p be a prime and κ be an integer such that κp < n r/6 /(4η(n)) for any constant r > 0. We can decrypt the sum of κ ciphertexts
σ i mod p with decryption error probability at most 2 −Ω(η 2 (n)) .
Proof. Since the precision is 2 −n log n , we can consider
. Replacing s and p by √ κ and κp respectively, we can evaluate the decryption errors with the same argument as the proof of Theorem C.4 by the fact that |⟨ȳ − y, u⟩| ≤ nλ2 −n log n = 2 −Ω(n) .
Security for Sum of Ciphertexts. Combining Lemma 3.11 with the security proof of A05 in [4] , we guarantee the security of the sum of ciphertexts in mA05 ′ . Note that we can regard
′ by replacing the precision 1/n of the ciphertexts to 2 −n log n .
Theorem C.7. If there exist two sequences of plaintexts (σ 1 , . . . , σ κ ) and (σ ′ 1 , . . . , σ ′ κ ) and a polynomial- 
D Proof of Theorem 3.2
For the proof of Theorem 3.2, we first describe the transference theorems.
D.1 Transference theorems
Let B(r) be an n-dimensional ball in R n centered at 0 with radius r, i.e., B(r) = {x ∈ R n : ∥x∥ ≤ r}.
where the sequence of vectors v 1 , . . . , v i ∈ L ranges over all i linearly independent lattice vectors.
It is not hard to show that
Banaszczyk showed the following transference theorem in [7] .
Theorem D.2 ([7]). For every n-dimensional lattice L and every constant c >
for all sufficiently large n.
, where span(L ′ ) is the linear subspace of R n spanned by the basis of L ′ . For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we define g i (L) to be the minimum r such that the sublattice generated by L ∩ B(r) contains an i-dimensional saturated sublattice L ′ . Clearly,
Cai improved Theorem D.2 as the following theorem.
Theorem D.3 ([9]).
For every an n-dimensional lattice L and for every constant c > 3/2π,
D.2 Proof of Theorem 3.2
Now, we give the proof of Theorem 3.2.
Proof of Theorem 3.2.
The proof is similar to the argument of [5, 6] . Let H u be the distribution of v i in the key generation procedure of AD GGH . Ajtai and Dwork gave the following two lemmas.
Lemma D.4 (Lemma 8.1, [6] We now evaluate the value of f (n). Given an instance of f (n)-uSVP, we obtain a lattice L by certain linear transformations shown in [6] such that we can efficiently compute its shortest vector u if there exists an efficient attacking algorithm for AD GGH . Then, the dual lattice J = L * of L has a saturated sublattice J ′ on a hyperplane H 0 orthogonal to u. Let l be the length of the smallest basis of J ′ , where the length of the basis B = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) is defined as max i=1,...,n ∥v i ∥.
It is also commented in [6] that the length l of the smallest basis of J ′ is approximately O(n 2 / f (n)). It also holds that this upper bound is O(n −r−3 ) by combining the argument in [6] with our generalization. Thus, we obtain f (n) = O(n r+5 ).
On the other hand, we obtain λ 2 (L) · g n−1 (L * ) ≤ cn by Theorem D.3 with i = 2, i.e., λ 2 (L) · l ≤ cn for some constant c > 3/2π. We can also see that λ 2 (L) ≥ f (n) ∥u∥ from the definition. Thus, we can obtain an upper bound O(n/ f (n)) of l.
By the above argument, we obtain f (n) = O(n r+4 ), which completes the proof of Theorem 3.2.
E Lattice Problems and Their Complexity
We list up well-known hard problems used for lattice-based cryptosystems. The length of vectors is defined by the l 2 norm in this paper. The shortest vector problem (SVP) and its approximation version (SVP γ ) have been deeply studied in the computer science. The NP-hardness of SVP was shown by Ajtai [3] under a randomized reduction in 1998. Recently, Khot [20] proved that SVP c is NP-hard under the assumption NP RP for any constant c. He also proved that SVP 2 O((log n) 1/2−ε ) is NP-hard within under the assumption NP RTIME(2 poly(log n) ).
Even within a polynomial approximation factor, it is not known whether there exists a polynomial-time algorithm for the approximation version of SVP. The most well-known solution to this approximation problem is the so-called LLL algorithm proposed in [23] . This algorithm can solve SVP 2 n/2 in polynomial time.
On the other hand, there are several non-NP-hardness results on the approximation version of SVP with a polynomial approximation factor. Goldreich and Goldwasser [12] showed SVP Ω( √ n/ log n) is in NP ∩ coAM. Aharonov and Regev [1] showed that SVP Ω( √ n) is in NP ∩ coNP. The unique shortest vector problem (uSVP) is also well known as a hard lattice problem applicable to cryptographic constructions. We say the shortest vector v of a lattice L is f -unique if for any non-zero vector x ∈ L which is not parallel to v, f ∥v∥ ≤ ∥x∥. The definition of uSVP is given as follows. f -uSVP) . Given a basis B of a lattice L whose shortest vector is f -unique, find a non-zero vector v ∈ L such that for any non-zero vector x ∈ L which is not parallel to v, f ∥v∥ ≤ ∥x∥.
Definition E.3 (
Similarly to the case of SVP, the exact version of uSVP is shown to be in NP-hard by Kumar and Sivakumar [21]. Cai [8] showed that Ω(n 1/4 )-uSVP is in NP ∩ coAM. See Figure 9 for the hardness of SVP and uSVP.
In the computational complexity theory on lattice problems, the shortest linearly independent vectors problem (SIVP) and its approximation version SIVP γ are also considered as a hard lattice problem.
Definition E.4 (SIVP)
. Given a basis B of a lattice L, find a sequence of n linearly independent vectors v 1 , . . . , v n ∈ L such that for any sequence of n linearly independent vectors x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ L, max i=1,...,n ∥v i ∥ ≤ max i=1,...,n ∥x i ∥.
Definition E.5 (SIVP γ ). Given a basis B of a lattice L, find a sequence of n linearly independent vectors v 1 , . . . , v n ∈ L such that for any sequence of n linearly independent vectors x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ L, max i=1,...,n ∥v i ∥ ≤ γ max i=1,...,n ∥x i ∥.
Although the Diophantine Approximation (DA) was originally a number-theoretic problem, DA is deeply related to the lattice theory. (See, e.g., [16] .) The problem DA is defined as follows. From a complexity-theoretical point of view, Lagarias [22] showed that decisional version of DA is NP-complete. Trolin [36] also showed a reduction from the decisional version of DA to a certain lattice problem. In the context of cryptography, Ajtai defined a variant of DA and constructed an efficient latticebased cryptosystem based on the hardness of this variant [4] . We refer to this variant as DA ′ , defined as follows. NP ∩ coAM Figure 9 : the hardness of SVP and uSVP
